INTRODUCTION
The Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has moved forward toward enhancing regional economic cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 1 , following the ASEAN-GCC two-year action plan (2010) (2011) (2012) that was endorsed in June 2010. The total trade between ASEAN and the GCC, comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was valued at USD83 billion in 2010. Within ASEAN, trade connectivity between Malaysia with the GCC region has likewise expanded over the recent years, culminating to the GCC-Malaysia agreement that was sealed in January 2011. The framework agreement allows for both parties to explore and leverage on areas of huge potential in trade and investment to set the stage for the eventual finalizing of a free trade agreement (FTA)2. Latest estimates indicate that trade between Malaysia and the GCC reached USD 11 billion in (MATRADE, 2011 .
Notwithstanding the above, the GCC still remains an insignificant trading partner of Malaysia (see also Abu-Hussin, 2010; ErU, 2011) . However, networking with this emerging market is of tremendous importance to the small but highly trade dependent Malaysia for the following three reasons. First, the recent economic global downturn has exposed the vulnerabilities of the country's over-reliance on traditional partners such as the United States (US), Europe and Japan. In pursuit of trade diversification'', it has now become the Malaysian national policy (BNM, 2010; NEAC, 2010) to orientate international trading strategies towards non traditional trading partners in West Asian markets, particularly with the GCC. Second, there is currently a growing body of literature and policy prescriptions emphasizing the importance 1 that with the ASEAN, or that their trade structures are similar. Based on the diversification indices of merchandise exports, there is a smaller difference between structure of trade of Malaysia and the world average. However, the differences in the trade structures of individual GCC economies with that of the world average are astoundingly high", Thus, one can expect that the trade structures between Malaysia and the GCC to be also somewhat different.
<fable 1 here>
There is also a high degree of trade concentration with specific economies within both regions. Within ASEAN, Singapore and Thailand are the major markets for Malaysia, whilst the UAE and Saudi Arabia are of utmost importance within the GCC. Malaysia's exports to the GCC is highly concentrated in the UAE, as the UAE is a cost-competitive location for offshoring the manufacture of advanced technological products, to serve both regional and international markets.
Though similarities are noted in terms of product-and market concentration for Malaysia's trade with both regions respectively, the same cannot be said for the structure and composition of trade. Table 2 presents the Grubel-Lloyd (GL, 1975) index" as a measure of Malaysia's trade structure with both regions. It is rather obvious that the Malaysia-GCC trade is one of inter-industry (IT) trade, whilst intra-industry trade (IIT\ mainly that of parts and components" (see for example Jongwanich, 2010) , dominates in the case of trade in manufactures between Malaysia and ASEAN (particularly with the pioneer ASEAN member economies). This is not surprising as there is no trade overlap in the exchanges between Malaysia and the GCC. For example, Malaysia's major exports to the UAE consists of electrical and electronic products (SITC 7), followed by jewellery (SITC 8), palm oil and wood products". Conversely, her major imports from the UAE include crude petroleum, metal and refined petroleum. In contrast, Malaysia's exports of manufactures to ASEAN and her corresponding imports are both concentrated in SITC 7 products. This again lends support to the fact that Malaysia-ASEAN trade involves similar exchanges. <fable 2 here> Malaysia's exports to the GCC are more diversified vis-it-vis her corresponding imports, thereby highlighting further the importance on tapping the Gulf market for expanding the export base. Thus, special attention is given to the trade structure (nature and composition of trade) in identifying the opportunities that prevail in networking with the Gulf economies, as this seems to be the main factor underlying the differences in Malaysia-GCC trade patterns from that of Malaysia-ASEAN.
3.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Model Specification and Theoretical Underpinnings
This paper employs the extended gravity model, developed by Chengang et al. (2010) based on Baltagi et al. (2003) 10, to investigate the influence of simple economic factors on bilateral trade flows between Malaysia with the GCC and the ASEAN economies. Using a panel data framework, the equation is specified as follows: In equations (1) and (2), P's represent the coefficient estimates,~is time effects and Sijt is a white-noise disturbance term.
The above equation follows from a standard gravity model compnsing gross domestic product (GDP) and geographical distance (GD) between countries, augmented with the stocks of inward foreign direct investment (FDS) and relative factor endowments (RLFAC) on the basis that the latter two variables are closely related to a country's trade capabilities and transaction costs respectively. The following explains the theories that underlie the selection of the explanatory variables in equations (1) and (2), beginning with the core variables of the gravity model.
The level of GDP of both reporter and partner countries are supposed to positively affect their trade. Instead of using the levels of GDP of both countries independently, the total GDP of both partners, GDPT, is included in the estimations to jointly capture economies of scale or the size effect. The higher the GDPT, the larger the trade flows, given that a greater division of labour and specialization becomes feasible under a larger scale of operation.
However, BaItagi et al. (2003) and Chengang et al. (2010) argue further that the level ofGDP alone may not be sufficient to explain trade as the similarities of the two trading partners
GDPs are of no less importance. From a theoretical perspective, similarity in the level of GDP (SIMGDP) or convergence in income levels (or tastes) is likely to increase trade either through the expansions in trade in manufactures or the increase in scope for product diversity.
The next core argument of the gravity model is the GD variable. GD remains important for considerations of transport costs (Egger, 2000) , transaction costs (Bergstrand, 1985; Edmonds et aI., 2008) and timeliness in delivery (see also Rojid, 2006) , and is included in the estimations. Thus, the expectations are for f3s < 0 (Tinbergen, 1962; Poyhonen, 1963) .
Based on the explanation of Chengang et al. (2010) , foreign direct investment (FDI) contributes to intra-firm trade through global production networks and the increase in product variety in the host economy. This in turn increases the volume of trade, mainly through liT. However, if FDI and trade are substitutes, for example if FDI is mainly channeled into domestic production of the host economy, then, it does not necessarily contribute to expansions in exports. As such, the relationship between FDS and international trade remains inconclusive. Differences in factor endowments or factor intensity (capital-labour ratio or K/L) do matter for international trade (see Bergstrand, 1990; Frankel et al., 1995; Baltagi et aI., 2003; Debaere, 2003; Ghosh and Yamarik, 2005; Chan-Hyun, 2005; Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2006; Cieslik, 2009) . Traditional neoclassical trade theories suggest that comparative advantages based on differences in factor endowments explain basically IT. Alternatively, newer trade theories based on economies of scale and product differentiation attribute similarities in factor endowments to trade expansions through lIT. Thus, the differences and similarities of factor endowments (apart from SIMGDP) are closely linked to the structure of trade. If the structure of trade is IT-based, differences in factor endowments'< will most likely facilitate trade expansion vis-a-vis similarities in factor endowments. We therefore do not expect new trade theories based on product differentiation to be relevant for the Malaysia-GCC trade. In this respect, the expected sign for P6 will be positive (negative) iflT (lIT) dominates.
Finally, border or contiguity effects (DUMContig), landlocked effects (DUMLand), common language (DUMComlang) and common or dominant religion (DUMComreligion) are included in the baseline estimations. Both common language and religion are considered a measure of cultural distance. Religious affinity, the Islamic faith in the case of Muslim countries, is expected to influence trade policies and consumption preferences (Mehanna, 2003 The analysis is first conducted combining Malaysia-GCC and Malaysia-ASEAN trade and subsequently, for trade with both regions estimated separately. The empirical estimations constitute a three-dimensional balanced panel of 630 observations (15 country-pairs x 2 product groups x 21 years; the cross-section dimension relates to the country-pair-product group) for the full sample, and 252 observations (6 country-pairs x 2 product groups x 21 years) and 378 observations (9 country-pairs x 2 product groups x 21 years) for the subsamples of Malaysia-GCC and Malaysia-ASEAN trade respectively. The broad product groups'? in the cross-sectional dimension refer to agriculture (HSOI-HS24) and industrial (HS25-HS97) sectors.
Data Characteristics
There is substantial variation in all the variables, with the exception for InGD. More interestingly, the two variables of interest that capture the influences of trade structure, SIMGDP and SIMFDS, display extremely high levels of variation. The plots of the variables, carricatured in Appendix Table 2 further depict the differing trends in both variables over the period 1990-2010. It can be inferred from these plots that there is growing convergence in country size and FDI stock between Malaysia and the GCC, whilst the opposite holds true with that for the ASEAN. There is no discernible trend for SIMFDS in the case of Malaysia-ASEAN. More importantly, the upward trend in the RLFAC for Malaysia-GCC implies growing factor endowment heterogeneity relative to the Malaysia-ASEAN case.
Prior to conducting the panel gravity estimates, the panel unit root tests are performed to ascertain the stationarity of the variables. We employed the IPS (Im et al., 2003) , LLC (Levin et al., 2002) and MW (Maddala and Wu, 1999) panel unit root tests, adding an intercept and a linear trend (see Appendix Table 3 ). Based on the IPS and MW tests, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the conventional significance levels only for InX and InTRADE. These variables are therefore stationary. In the case of the LLC test, all variables are stationary with the exception for InGDPT and RLFAC. Since the IPS and MW tests, which assume the individual unit root process, are more powerful than the LLC, we may conclude that most of the variables under investigation are 1(1).
We however note here that these panel unit root tests may be misleading as recent studies have shown that cross dependency, which is a common characteristic in panel data studies, may favour the nonstationary null. With this in mind, we performed the Kao's (1999) cointegration test for residuals and found that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 1 per cent significance level for Malaysia-ASEAN, but not in the case of Malaysia-GCC exports (see Appendix Table 4 ). The panel cointegration tests therefore point to the existence of a long-run relationship between variables for the case of Malaysia-ASEAN exports (and trade) and Malaysia-GCC trade. The RE estimator is chosen for the following reasons, despite the fact that the Fixed Effects (FE) estimator is much more common in gravity models than the RE estimator (see Egger, 2000) . The RE estimator has the advantage of not requiring the exclusion of variables that are time invariant. In this case, both the distance (GD) , border or contiguity effects (DUMContig), landlocked effects (DUMLand), common language (DUMComlang) and common or dominant religion (DUMComreligion) are invariant across time periods, and these variables are of considerable interest to this study. Furthermore, all of the variables exhibit more variation in the data across country-pair-product group (between variation) than over time (within variation). This is not surprising given the large number of cross-section entities (based on country-pair-product groups) used for the estimations, which are believed to have some influence on bilateral exports. As such, a FE may not work well for data with minimal within variation or for variables that change slowly over time.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: INSIGHTS FROM THE GRAVITY MODEL
As expected, the combined total size of Malaysia with her trading partners positively affects the volume of trade activity. The size effect is however non-significant for the Malaysia-ASEAN trade flows. The estimated coefficient, PI, in the full sample fits the higher end of the 0.75-0.95 range, as derived in various studies (Chan-Hyun, 2005) . However, the coefficient of the product of GDPs is undeniably high for Malaysia-GCC trade flows, indicating that an increased size has a more than proportional effect on exports. One plausible reason why the increase in bilateral trade volume is more than proportionate to the increase in GDP is the smaller home-bias effect. The Malaysian local distribution network is limited given the small market base for final goods. From this, we can conjecture that Malaysia's trade with the GCC depends more on exporting quantity-based final products that are sensitive to overall market size.
The coefficients for FDST and SIMFDS are generally positive but insignificant for the GCC sub-sample, whilst it is negative for the ASEAN case. The results imply weak evidence in support of substitute effects between FDI and total trade in the Malaysia-ASEAN case. Interestingly, the negative relationship between SIMFDS and trade for both Malaysia-GCC and Malaysia-ASEAN trade flows suggest that similar sizes of FDS have lowered bilateral trade, concurring with theory. In the case of the GCC, the possible explanation for this negative relationship is that the GCC states have already an abundance of capital and ultimately do not depend on FDI to boost trade. Rather, they seek FDI selectively, particularly those which brings technology transfer given their limited research and development (R&D) capabilities (EIU, 2011).
More importantly, is the trade impact of SIMGDP and RLFAC, which explains the underlying trade structure. We find that if Malaysia is similar in size with her GCC trading partner, she exports more, whilst the opposite holds when the trading partner is an ASEAN counterpart. Given the structure of IT trade between Malaysia and the GCC, it is therefore not surprising to note that the significant (albeit weak) positive impact of RLFAC on trade. We posit that comparative advantage based on differences in factor endowments is most likely to explain trade behaviour between Malaysia and the GCC.
Finally, geographical distance is not a resistance factor for the Malaysia-GCC trade. Likewise, cultural distances (common language and religious affinity) also do not significantly influence trade (see also Abu-Hussin, 2010; see also Insel and Tekce, 2010 for GCC's trade with the rest of the world). One plausible reason for this is the type of goods traded between Malaysia and the GCC and the geographical location of the GCC region. The GCC imports manufactured goods that are not produced by the regional or neighbouring economies (see Table 2 ), as the region is surrounded either by countries that also have an abundance of oil reserves or low income countries. Thus, those dummy variables are excluded from the estimation in Table 3 .
Since FDI and new growth theories suggest that GDPT and FDST are likely to be endogenous, the Hausman and Taylor's estimator (henceforth HT, 1981) technique is employed. Qualitatively, the HT results in Table 4 are similar to the RE estimates. Likewise, the estimations are conducted solely for Malaysia-GCC and Malaysia-ASEAN trade in manufactures'i', since this sector dominates in trade flows with both regions. The results are again found to be remarkably robust in terms of the signs and significance of the coefficient estimates.
Overall, the gravity estimates clearly imply the importance of the size effect, similarities in GDP and differences in factor endowments as drivers of trade flows between Malaysia and the GCC.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR MALAYSIA-GCC
At the outset, the GCC-Malaysia (and the ASEAN-GCC) agreement seem to contend with the view that economic regionalism is increasing along civilization lines, that is trade pacts are bordering on common culture and religion. However, the gravity estimates have clearly pointed out that these factors are not significant to increasing bilateral trade. For example, most distributors of halal products are not from Muslim countries, with many international producers having recognised the potential of the market and investing accordingly. In fact, although Malaysia has taken the lead in developing and modernising this sector, she has essentially lost out to competitors from the West. Meat and halal products are now being imported by GCC from many countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Brazil, Canada and the US. Further, regional producers have increased production and are slowly reducing the Gulf region's import dependence. Companies such as the UAE-based al-Islami Foods have started to assume the regional mantle.
Following which, non cultural factors are more likely to play an influential role in enhancing bilateral trade between Malaysia and the GCC. From the discussion in the preceeding sections, Malaysia obviously needs to capitalize on high degrees of IT and differences in factor endowments with the GCC to promote exports to the latter. The lack of production base in capital and equipment goods in the GCC more specifically provide avenues for the expansion of Malaysia's trade in manufactures'", Notwithstanding the above mentioned opportunities, there are some challenges, outside the purview of the empirical estimations of this paper, which warrant attention. (Appendix Table  5 provides an idea on the overall business climate in the GCC based on major trade and investment policies). One such issue is the political tensions that prevail in the Gulf region.
Trade and investment relationships with Bahrain, for example, are unlikely to take stronghold given the current large-scale anti-government demonstrations in the latter. Moreover, if the government of Bahrain remains focused on short-term survival, then, efforts at diversifying away from the hydrocarbon sector could also slow.
Second, is the issue of corruption, notable in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In Saudi, bribes and the use of commission is widespread. As for Qatar, the intellectual property right (IPR) protection regime is still found to be inadequate. The US trade negotiators have noted that Qatar has encountered some difficulties in enforcing copyright laws and has suggested that IPR legislation may not be in full conformity with Qatar's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) requirements under its WTO membership. Apart from corruption, is the extensive bureaucracy, which is a major drawback for companies doing business especially in Saudi Arabia. Heightened security precautions, lengthy and arduous tendering processes and difficult visa procedures all present problems for foreign firms who view red tape as a significant obstacle to investment in the kingdom. Likewise, in Kuwait, highly bureaucratic application hinder Kuwait's business climate and foreign companies still report numerous delays in getting approval'" to operate in Kuwait.
Third, is the broadly restrictive trade and investment regime in specific Gulf economies. Saudi commercial law remains undeveloped and the legal system can be heavily weighted against foreign investors, with Saudi partners free to remove foreigners' exit visas while courts can impose precautionary restraint of personal property, pending the adjudication of a commercial dispute. Indeed, foreign firms' major complaints centre on the inadequate dispute settlement mechanisms in Saudi Arabia, which remain slow and uncertain. There is little overall protection for foreign investors within the legal system. Investors therefore question the ability of Saudi courts to enforce contracts efficiently. Though the government has in recent years updated the Trademark Law, the Copyright Law and the Patent Law, enforcement of these new laws is weak and procedures inconsistent. Following which, capital inflows to the GCC (except for Qatar) generally remain weak.
That said, there are individual Gee economies that offer better prospects in terms of trade and investment networking opportunities for Malaysia. Here, we would like to mention three countries of the six-member group, Oman, Qatar and the UAE. Oman, for its pro-business stance and, lacking the hydrocarbons endowment of other Gulf states, is actively seeking to court FDI in key strategic areas of its diversifying economy: the gas sector and the downstream gas industries. Qatar, with its less domestic political challenges, is one of only a few states in the Gee (along with the UAE) to accommodate those investors put off by the weakening political risk profile of the region. Qatar remains an attractive destination in the Middle East for foreign investment as there are few security risks and a wealth of attractive opportunities and incentives for foreign investment in both the oil and non-oil sectors. The UAE, with one of the most liberal trade regimes in the Gulf -more than three-quarters of goods entering the country duty free -has also some of the best physical infrastructure (World Bank, 2010) in the Gulf region. It has thus established itself as a major trade hub within the Gee.
The high income economies of the Gee can therefore provide the base to attract marketseeking FDI, as size effects (based on the gravity estimates of this paper) and technology know-how'{ (EIU, 2010) matter for Malaysia-Gee trade. From the Malaysian perspective instead, FDI from the Gee still record less than 1 per cent of total FDI inflows to the manufacturing sector (Figure 2 ), whilst the ASEAN countries contribute 8 per cent of the total. In total, only 31 projects from the Gee were approved by Malaysia vis-a-vis 3,188 projects from the ASEAN for the period 1990-2010. The spike in FDI inflow from Gee in 2003 is represented by only 2 major projects totaling RM3,952 million. The approved investments from the Gee may not involve many projects, but the quantum of investment per project is substantially higher relative to that from the ASEAN.
<Figure 2 here> By country, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are major investors from the Gulf9. Both these Gulf investors are drawn to invest mainly in the Iskandar Development Region, Southern Peninsular Malaysia, given its proximity to Singapore. Table 4 compares the approved investments in the manufacturing sector with Gee and ASEAN participation for the period 1990-2010. Prior to 2005, Saudi Arabia was the only investor from the Gulf, and since then, UAE has emerged as the top investor, commanding a share of 78 per cent of total Gee projects approved in Malaysia. Most of the investments from the UAE flowed into machinery equipment, followed by petroleum and chemical industries, which are considered potential areas of investments for the Gulf countries in Malaysia. Likewise, Singapore is the largest investor in Malaysia within the ASEAN regional context.
< Table 4 here>
From the above discussion, it is obvious that the opportunities that prevail from trade and investment with the Gee are likely to be disproportionate across individual Gulf economies, as the Gee in itself is a grouping of unequal partners with different strengths. Trade and investment networking between Malaysia and the Gee region is therefore more likely to intensify with "core" regional economies. The UAE in particular is poised to take on this role, having a strong re-exporting business in the Middle East (Abu-Russin, 2010; World Bank, 2010) with manufactures representing twice the shares in each of the other Gulf economies, and having the strongest trade (see Table 1 ) and investment (see Table 4 ) links with Malaysia. The importance of a "core" economy is not something new as it is also very much relevant for trade within the ASEAN context, though the networking opportunities in this region are somewhat different from that of the GCC. Common to both the GCC and ASEAN regions, is the influential role of China. China is at the "core" of the ASEAN regional production networks, sourcing components from within the region, and China 20 also maintains strong trade relations with all GCC economies. Consumer goods remain the GCC's major imports, of which the sector is dominated by China (EIU, 2011). China exports electrical machinery, textiles, iron and steel to China. The GCC demand for consumption goods from China thus provides an alternative to demand from developed markets in the West, and this in tum could witness a rise in input sourcing by China from the ASEAN region. Therefore Malaysia (and the other ASEAN countries) is also expected to benefit from China's direct trading relationship with the GCC.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper is intended to be a purely empirical investigation, attempting to assess, and compare Malaysia's trade with GCC relative to that of ASEAN, to present opportunities for Malaysia that prevail in trade with the former. The following summarizes the salient results.
Malaysia's trade flows to the GCC depend on economies of scale (size effect), similar country size (similar preferences) and differences in factor endowments. Conversely, trade flows to the ASEAN depend on dissimilar country size and similarities in factor endowments. Broadly, this reflects the differences in the trade structure that underlies Malaysia-GCC from that of Malaysia-ASEAN. In the case of the former, IT dominates whilst trade flows with the latter depend on IIT.
Thus, the Gulf region provides opportunities for Malaysia to export quantity-based final (enduse) products and to diversify its exporting strategy away from quality-based parts and components, whose end-use is external. The latter trade flows are subject to external demand, outside the ASEAN market, and are therefore subject to shocks emanating from outside the region. This volatility exposure can be mitigated through diversification. The highly trade dependent Malaysia therefore needs to find new markets for exporting final goods to ensure continued export dynamisms, and in this respect, the Gulf provides an avenue for both product and market diversification. The present low trade level between Malaysia and the GCC emerging market may well represent unexplored trade opportunity. Notes: 1. The GL index is calculated at the 5-digit SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) level, prior to aggregation. 2. The composition of trade in manufactures represent the distribution of trade across the five broad SITC groups. 3. SITC 5 -chemicals and related products; SITC 6 -manufactured goods classified chiefly by material; SITC 7 -machinery and transport equipment and SITC 8 -miscellaneous manufactured articles. Source: Calculated from UN COMTRADE.
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or associate and subsidiary enterprises, it is the value of the share of their capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent enterprise (this is equal to total assets minus total liabilities), plus the net indebtedness of the associate or subsidiary to the parent firm. For branches, it is the value of fixed assets and the value of current assets and investments, excluding amounts due from the parent, less Total labour force comprises people ages 15 and older who meet the International Labour Organization definition of the economically active population. Capital stock is estimated from the GFCF using the standard perpetual inventory calculation method (see footnote 1). The GFCF consists of outlays on additions to the fixed assets (land improvements; plant,machinery and equipment purchases; construction of roads, railways and the like) of the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. The GFCF, expressed in current USD, is deflated by the CPI index with 2000 as the base year.
GD
The average distance (in kilometres) between the capitals of i and j. 
200.
2000 Oman -Automatic approval is granted to major projects with up to 70% foreign ownership, while 100% foreign ownership of investment projects is allowed so long as this is approved by the Ministry of Commerce & Industry.
-Industrial incentives include 5-year tax holidays, renewable by another 5 years; and exemption from customs duties on equipment and raw materials during the first 10 years of a project.
-Some luxury items have a 20% duty. There is a 100% duty levied on alcohol, tobacco, limes and pork products.
-A FTZ exists at a border crossing point with Yemen. -100 per cent foreign ownership allowed in a range of sectors: New industrial and service companies (that establish representative offices or branches in Bahrain); Regional distribution services (as long as these do not exclusively engage in domestic commercial sales).
Appendix
-Strong intellectual property rights (IPR).
-A free transit zone at Mina Sulman, its major port, and an industrial free zone at North Sitra Industrial Estate that offer foreign investors the same terms and tax incentives as local companies.
Kuwait -Non-Kuwaitis can own up to 100% of local companies in 11 specified sectors.
-Foreign investors can now enjoy tax holidays of up to 10 years and have the freedom to import expatriate labour (subject to quotas imposed by the Kuwaitisation programme -foreign investors will be able to obtain the benefits of the new regime only if they employ a percentage of Kuwaiti nationals in the new venture).
-A 15% protective tariff prevails where imports are in competition with domestically made goods in 'infant industries.' There are a number of areas where authorities can impose discretionary tariffs, such as tobacco, where a 70% tariff applies.
-Weak IPR protection and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the form of testing and inspection.
-One Free Trade Zone (FTZ) at Shuwaikh, and planning another FTZ at Bubiyan Island.
Saudi -100% ownership and also equalised treatment with national companies through investment Arabia incentives.
-A negative list bars foreign investment in three manufacturing categories -oil and gas exploration and production.
-Only Saudis are allowed to participate in trading activities or act as commercial agents.
-Tariffs of 12-20% imposed on a list of more than 800 'protected commodities' and a number of Saudi 'infant industries' enjoy tariff protection, including furniture, cooking salt, mineral water and plastic pipes. Cigarettes, wheat, flour, dates and long-life milk imports have a 100% tariff.
-No FTZs.
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Appendix Table 5 Contd.
Country Policy Climate
Qatar -Foreign ownership capped at 49%, with the Qatari partner(s) holding at least 51%.
-A Qatari company can be 100% foreign-owned if it operates in the agriculture and industry sectors, especially in areas that require technical transfer, research & development or the upskilling of the local labour force.
-Alcohol and tobacco products are subject to a 100% tariff while certain steel items are subject to a 20% duty. In addition, import licensing applies to all products and only Qataris are able to obtain import licences -confirming the continued existence of agency agreements that allow the agents to have exclusive distribution rights for certain products.
-Inadequate IPR.
-NTBs such as tough licensing requirements and quota restrictions.
-A FTZ at Doha International Airport, where the usual range of tax exemptions apply.
UAE -Foreign shareholders may only hold up to a 49% equity interest in limited liability companies, with a minimum of 51% national ownership, although profits may be divided differently. Full foreign ownership is only allowed within FTZs.
-The average tariff rate is just 4%, while FTZs offer numerous incentives, such as exemptions from taxes and duties. The customs duty for most items is 5% calculated on CIF value. Imports of liquor are subject to a 70% customs duty while imports of tobacco products face a 100% duty on their CIF value. But a number of essential items -staple foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals -duty-free status.
-Full corporate tax and customs duty exemption on imported raw materials and equipment. No levy on exports and imports.
-NTBs in the form of restrictive agency or distribution requirements.
-Regional leader in the protection ofIPRs -grant patents to pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals products, forced to put a halt to import quotas on textiles based on the WTO TRIPs.
-12 FTZs in operation, developed along specialised lines -covering JCT, media, finance, gold and jewellery and health care. Jebel Ali Free Zone, in Dubai, is one of the world's largest FTZs. 
